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**NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER**

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

**31 DEC 1981**

**NOTE FOR THE DIRECTOR**

The attached memorandum on Chad was prepared at the request of Fred Wettering, the Africa Representative of the National Security Council staff, and has been sent directly to him.

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*John* John McMahon

Attachment:  
As Stated

cc: DDCI

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

30 December 1981

MEMORANDUMCHAD: KEY PLAYERS IN ITS FACTIONAL STRIFE 

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## SUMMARY

As 1982 begins, Chad's factional struggle is intensifying. President Goukouni's beleaguered coalition government faces an increasingly serious threat in central Chad from insurgent leader Habre, whose forces in recent weeks have moved westward from their eastern stronghold in a series of successes that could cause the regime to split apart and full-fledged civil war to resume. OAU peacekeeping troops could soon face their first test as a neutral buffer intended to separate Chad's feuding factions. The peacekeeping force is reluctant to fight the insurgents, however, and it might stand aside if there is a major confrontation.

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Habre probably still hopes to trade on his growing military strength to negotiate his reentry into Chad's coalition government, but the relative ease of his recent victories could embolden him to try again to seize power. Meanwhile, President Goukouni faces mounting criticism from other government factional leaders for his decision last November to dispense with Libyan troops. He seems increasingly desperate and might ask Libya to return if his position deteriorates much more. The Libyans pulled out of Chad partly to show Goukouni that he could not survive his country's chronic factional strife without them, and Tripoli probably would come to his aid again if his government were to make a formal request.

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This memorandum was prepared by  West and East Africa Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis. It was requested by Fred Wattering of the National Security Council and has been coordinated with the Directorate of Operations, the Offices of Near East-South Asia Analysis and Central Reference, and the National Intelligence Officer for Africa. Information as of 29 December 1981 was used in preparation of this paper. Comments and questions are welcome and should be addressed to the Chief, West and East Africa Division,

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